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SYMPOSIUM
CIVIL LITIGATION REFORM IN THE
TRUMP ERA: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES
SEARCHING FOR
SALVAGEABLE IDEAS IN FICALA
Howard M. Erichson*
INTRODUCTION
The Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 (FICALA) was
introduced in Congress less than three weeks after Donald Trump took office
as President.1 Supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce2 and opposed
by consumer advocates and civil rights groups,3 the bill passed the House of
Representatives one month after its introduction on a party-line vote of 220

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Serhiy Moshak for his

research assistance and to all the participants in the Fordham Law Review Symposium, Civil
Litigation Reform in the Trump Era: Threats and Opportunities, held at Fordham University
School of Law on February 23, 2018, for their productive discussion of these issues.

1. Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act
of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill was introduced on February 9, 2017, by
Representative Bob Goodlatte, Republican of Virginia. After its introduction, FICALA was
merged with H.R. 906, the Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency (FACT) Act of 2017.
2. See Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives
(Mar.
8,
2017),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
170308_kv_hr985_fairnessinclassactionlitigationandfurtheringasbestosclaimtransparencyact
_house.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8C9-SYX3]; see also Letter from Lisa A. Rickard, President,
U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Representative Bob Goodlatte and Representative
John Conyers (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/letter/hr-985-the-fairness-classaction-litigation-act-2017 [https://perma.cc/MQ5U-Z2UX].
3. See, e.g., Letter from Jocelyn D. Larkin, Exec. Dir., Impact Fund, to Representative
Paul Ryan and Representative Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 7, 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/559b2478e4b05d22b1e75b2d/t/58bf37c73e00be8bb74c3dd8/1488926663702/HR985+
Ryan+Pelosi.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF5V-24VY] (writing on behalf of 123 civil rights
organizations); Letter from Jocelyn D. Larkin, Exec. Dir., Impact Fund, to Representative Bob
Goodlatte
and
Representative
John
Conyers,
Jr.
(Feb.
15,
2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559b2478e4b05d22b1e75b2d/t/58a5e62debbd1a8a000
fbcee/1487267374907/Civil+Rights+Opposition+to+HR+985+for+Sign+Ons+-+2.15.17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MJB-22HB] (writing on behalf of 121 civil rights organizations); Maxwell
S. Kennerly, H.R. 985: A Sneak Attack on Veterans, Consumers, and Patients, LITIG. & TRIAL
BLOG (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2017/02/articles/litigation/hr-985fairness/ [https://perma.cc/68LC-5KXU].
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to 201, with 220 Republicans and zero Democrats voting in favor.4 FICALA
stalled in the Senate and, as of this writing, does not appear to be moving
toward passage in its current form.5 But reform ideas have a way of
reappearing, particularly when driven by a constituency with much at stake
and plenty of resources to push an agenda. Corporations that face mass
litigation are a powerful voice for change, and class actions and multidistrict
litigation are prime targets. Moreover, the quick vote in the House shows
that there is at least some political appetite for the proposed reforms. In
anticipation of the reincarnation of the bill in some form, it is worth exploring
whether it contains any good ideas.
FICALA is not an easy place to look for good ideas. The bill represents
the most aggressive attempt in recent memory to dismantle the apparatus of
mass litigation through procedural reform.6 When the package is viewed as
a whole, it is difficult to see it as anything other than a defendant-driven effort
to reduce liability exposure by making it difficult for plaintiffs to aggregate
claims, difficult for plaintiffs’ lawyers to make money, expensive for
plaintiffs to pursue claims to adjudication, and difficult for plaintiffs’ lawyers
to choose the forum. As a package, FICALA is one-sided and most of its
provisions are ill-conceived. Hidden among FICALA’s bad ideas, however,
are a few good ones, and they represent promising opportunities for
improving the litigation process. Thus, rather than simply bash the bill,7 this
Article breaks down a number of the proposals and considers each idea on its
own terms.
While most of the proposals in FICALA are bad ideas, they are bad ideas
in three rather different ways. Some are bad ideas because they purport to
solve things that are not really problems. Others are bad ideas because,
although they address real problems, they do so in a careless or
4. See 163 CONG. REC. H1999–2000 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2017). In addition to the 220 who
voted “Yes,” fourteen Republicans voted “No.” Id. On March 13, 2017, the bill was received
in the Senate and transferred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See H.R. 985 (as passed by
House and referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
5. See Bruce Kaufman, Business-Friendly Litigation Overhaul Stalls in Senate, BNA
(July 27, 2017), https://www.bna.com/businessfriendly-litigation-overhaul-n73014462386/
[https://perma.cc/MN3G-MMRG].
6. An earlier version of FICALA was introduced in 2016 and met a similar fate: after
passage in the House, it died quietly in the Senate. See Fairness in Class Action Litigation and
Furthering Asbestos Claims Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. (2016) (as
introduced on Apr. 22, 2015, passed House on Jan. 8, 2016, and referred to Senate). The prior
version, however, did not go nearly as far as the 2017 version. The bill’s proponents
presumably were emboldened by Republican control of both houses and the election of a
business-oriented Republican president. FICALA can be seen as part of a longer retrenchment
phenomenon of legislative and judicial efforts to curtail litigation. See Stephen B. Burbank &
Sean Farhang, Rights and Retrenchment in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2018).
7. My views on the bill are no secret; I was an early and outspoken opponent. See Howard
M. Erichson, New Republican Bill Would Gut Class Actions, Not Improve Them, HILL (Feb.
20, 2017, 1:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/lawmaker-news/320360-newrepublican-bill-would-gut-class-actions-not-improve-them [https://perma.cc/MK99-Z5SV];
see also Letter from Howard M. Erichson to Representatives Paul Ryan, Nancy Pelosi, Bob
Goodlatte, and John Conyers, Jr. (Feb. 18, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/
erichson-hr985-letter-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD69-LCM7].
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counterproductive way. And some are bad ideas because, as a matter of
institutional competency, Congress ought not intervene. Thus, to search for
reforms worthy of salvaging, one must ask about each proposed reform
whether it addresses a problem worth solving, whether the proposed solution
is a sensible way to address the identified problem, and whether Congress is
well situated to address the problem.
This Article begins with the three ways in which various proposals in
FICALA are bad ideas, before turning to the several promising ones. Part I
of this Article notes aspects of FICALA that purport to solve things that are
not real problems. Part II comments on FICALA provisions that address real
problems but offer ill-conceived solutions. Part III points out issues
addressed in FICALA that Congress should leave to the courts or to the
judicial rulemaking process. Finally, Part IV highlights aspects of FICALA
that address real problems, propose sensible solutions (or could be tweaked
into sensible solutions), and for which Congress is reasonably well situated
to act. In particular, it points to provisions that align class counsel fees with
value for class members, provisions that improve data collection concerning
class action settlements, and a provision to work around the complete
diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction.8 By highlighting promising
provisions in FICALA and distinguishing them from unwise provisions, the
Article aims to facilitate productive reform that recognizes both the problems
in mass litigation and the value of a justice system that enables plaintiffs to
pursue aggregate litigation of related claims.
I. PROPOSALS THAT ADDRESS NONPROBLEMS
Several of the ideas in FICALA make no sense except as corporate wishlist items. One can see why corporate defendants would desire these reforms,
just as a manufacturer might desire a rule that eliminates products liability,
or an employer might desire a rule that eliminates liability for wage theft.
Defendants naturally prefer not to be sued. And if they are sued, they prefer
not to be held liable. And if they are held liable, they prefer it to happen later
rather than sooner. The FICALA proposals itemized in this Part serve these
goals of corporate defendants, but as a matter of litigation policy, the
proposals solve nonproblems.
A. “Same Type and Scope of Injury” Requirement
for Class Certification
In one of its signature provisions, FICALA would prohibit certification of
any class action seeking monetary relief, unless the plaintiff “affirmatively
demonstrates that each proposed class member suffered the same type and
scope of injury as the named class representative.”9 Although it would make
it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain class certification, the provision does
not add anything useful to existing requirements for class certification.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 54–71.
9. H.R. 985 § 103(a).
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The class certification requirements of Rule 23 already necessitate
cohesiveness among class members. Rule 23(a) requires that class claims
share common questions,10 that class representatives’ claims be typical of
those of class members,11 and that class representatives adequately represent
the interests of class members.12 In addition, for class actions seeking money
damages, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that common questions
predominate over individual questions and that a class action be the superior
means of resolving the dispute.13
The question, then, is what is added by the “same type and scope of injury”
requirement? To the extent “same scope” means that class members’ claims
cannot vary in the extent of damages suffered, this is an unreasonable
requirement that would wipe out many appropriate class actions for no good
reason. To the extent “same type” does any work beyond the current
typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) and other class certification
requirements, it would make it impossible for plaintiffs to pursue class
actions on behalf of groups of consumers, employees, or others who are
similarly, but not identically, situated. But if a class action satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3)—that is, if the class
representative has a claim that is typical of the class members, if common
questions predominate, and if a class action is the superior method for
resolving the controversy—then there is no justification for disabling the
class action on grounds of nonidentical types of harm. The bill’s proponents
hope that this provision would eliminate class actions on behalf of consumers
who have not suffered concrete harm.14 The “no injury” question, however,
is better addressed under the law of standing or under the substantive law that
applies to the claims, rather than by an independent constraint on class
certification.
B. Ascertainability Requirement for Class Certification
The statute would prohibit certification of a class action seeking monetary
relief unless the plaintiff “affirmatively demonstrates that there is a reliable
and administratively feasible mechanism (a) for the court to determine
whether putative class members fall within the class definition and (b) for
distributing directly to a substantial majority of class members any monetary
relief secured for the class.”15 This provision is unnecessary because courts

10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352
(2011) (emphasizing that there must be “some glue” holding the class members’ claims
together).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
12. Id. r. 23(a)(4).
13. Id. r. 23(b)(3).
14. See The FICALA Fix for Litigation Abuse, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM
(Mar.
3, 2017),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/the-ficala-fix-forlitigation-abuse [https://perma.cc/7VJE-A36K] (arguing that the “FICALA Fix” for “‘No
Injury’ Class Actions” is to require the “same type and scope” of injury).
15. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103(a) (2017).
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already require that a class be adequately defined for class certification.16
Problems of identifying individual class members can be addressed at the
remedy stage. If remedial difficulties loom so large that a class action is not
a superior means of resolving the dispute, then a court should deny class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement. But if a class
action remains the best way to resolve a dispute, notwithstanding the
challenges of identifying class members, then the class should be certified.17
C. Interlocutory Appeals from Class Certification Decisions
The statute would require appellate courts to permit appeals from orders
granting or denying class certification.18 This provision is unnecessary
because Rule 23(f) already permits interlocutory appeals from class
certification decisions at the discretion of the appellate court.19 It makes
sense to permit such interlocutory appeals because a denial of class
certification may be a death knell for the litigation and a grant of class
certification may create significant settlement pressure. But some class
certification denials and grants are straightforward. There is no sense in
taking the time for interlocutory appeals in cases where the denial or grant is
sufficiently clear such that the appellate court is uninterested in hearing the
appeal. Removing the discretion to decline to hear appeals of obviously
correct decisions would merely slow the litigation process.
D. Automatic Discovery Stay upon Defendant Motions
FICALA provides that, in any class action, “all discovery and other
proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to transfer,
motion to dismiss, motion to strike class allegations, or other motion to
dispose of the class allegations” unless the court finds that particular
discovery is needed to preserve evidence or prevent undue prejudice.20 The
burden of discovery is real, and in some cases, defendants ought to be
protected from this burden where pretrial motions may dispose of the case or
significantly narrow the issues. District court judges already have the power
to stay discovery pending such motions.21 They exercise discretion by
considering both the discovery burden on the defendant and the plaintiffs’
interest in moving forward expeditiously.22 FICALA would remove most of
16. See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2017).
17. See id. at 267–69; see also Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th
Cir. 2017).
18. H.R. 985 § 103(a).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
20. H.R. 985 § 103(a).
21. See Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to
Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 76–77
(2012).
22. In Thornton v. DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc., the court stayed discovery in a
putative class action pending resolution of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and explained
the factors as follows:
When exercising its discretion in evaluating a request for a stay of discovery, the
Court considers the following factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding
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the district judge’s discretion by making the stay mandatory absent a finding
of undue prejudice.23 The bill’s approach, which in some cases would
accomplish nothing other than delay, imposes a one-size-fits-all rule in an
area better left to judicial discretion.
E. MDL Trial Prohibition
The multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute permits transfer of related cases
to a single federal district judge for pretrial handling.24 Although MDL
judges lack the power to try cases that have been transferred under the MDL
statute,25 they may try cases that have been filed in their own district or
transferred to them pursuant to the general federal venue transfer statute.26
FICALA would remove this power of MDL judges to try cases. In the
absence of consent by all parties, a transferee judge overseeing an MDL
would be barred from conducting a trial “in a civil action transferred to or
directly filed in the proceedings.”27
Trials are not the problem. The problem, if anything, is the opposite:
litigation can get bogged down in MDL-coordinated proceedings in a way
that makes it difficult and time-consuming for claims to reach adjudication
on the merits. MDL judges lack the power to try most of the cases before
them, but their ability to try a few bellwether cases has proved useful for
generating information that can lead to global settlements.28 The fact that
MDL judges occasionally try cases is not a problem to be solved with a
statutory prohibition, but rather a sensible approach to managing certain
types of mass litigation.
F. Interlocutory Appeals from MDL Orders
in Personal Injury Actions
FICALA would expand opportunities for interlocutory appeals, thereby
slowing the litigation process. It provides that an appellate court must permit
an appeal from any order in an MDL personal injury action if “an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of one
or more civil actions in the proceedings.”29 This provision is unnecessary
because the current exceptions to the final judgment rule—particularly the

expeditiously with discovery and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay;
(2) the burden on the defendants of proceeding with discovery; (3) the convenience
to the Court of staying discovery; (4) the interests of nonparties in either staying or
proceeding with discovery; and (5) the public interest in either staying or proceeding
with discovery.
No. 13-cv-00573-RBJ-KMT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145458, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 2013).
23. See H.R. 985 § 103(a).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
25. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998).
26. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.132 (2004).
27. H.R. 985 § 105.
28. See generally Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008).
29. H.R. 985 § 105.
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availability of certified interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)—
provide adequate opportunities for appeals to address potentially dispositive
issues.30 The main differences between the FICALA provision and the
existing general provision for certified interlocutory appeals are that the
FICALA provision does not require district judge certification and does not
give the appellate court discretion to decline the appeal. There is no good
reason to impose a broader right of interlocutory appeals in MDL.
II. PROPOSALS THAT ADDRESS REAL PROBLEMS
BUT OFFER POOR SOLUTIONS
A number of the proposals in FICALA address issues that are genuine
problems in the litigation system and are worthy of serious thought to
formulate useful reforms. Of these, a few of the FICALA proposals point
the way to sensible solutions; these are discussed in Part IV of this Article.
Most of the proposals, however, offer solutions that would do more harm
than good. FICALA’s proponents latched onto real problems as a ploy to
achieve liability-avoidance reforms.
A. Prohibition on Class Counsel Fees Until Completion
of Class Member Payments
One of FICALA’s class action provisions—innocuously labeled “Fee
Distribution Timing”—states: “In a class action seeking monetary relief, no
attorneys’ fees may be determined or paid pursuant to Rule 23(h) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise until the distribution of any
monetary recovery to class members has been completed.”31 As drafted, this
provision would either make it difficult for class action lawyers to get paid
or discourage class action lawyers from negotiating settlements with longterm monetary remedies, even in cases where such remedies are appropriate,
such as those involving diseases with long latency periods.
Underlying the proposal, however, is an important insight. The value of a
remedy to class members may not be measurable up front but instead may
require time to see how the remedy plays out. Particularly if a class
settlement or adjudication provides monetary relief on a claims-made basis,
one cannot know in advance the extent to which class members will actually
receive compensation. The FICALA fee-delay proposal, viewed in its best
light, represents a clumsy effort to defer the determination of class counsel
fees until after the value of the remedy is known. One can envision revising
the proposal into a sensible system of periodic class counsel payments based
on periodic accounting of amounts received by class members. This idea is
discussed in Part IV.32 But the FICALA approach—a flat prohibition on
payments to class counsel until after the last distribution to class members—

30. See MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 15.11.
31. H.R. 985 § 103(a) (proposing a new section to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1718(b)(1)).
32. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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would have the problematic effect of discouraging lawyers from negotiating
settlements that involve long claims processes even where appropriate.
B. Limits on Who Can Serve as Class Counsel
and Class Representative
FICALA would require disclosure of certain relationships between
proposed class representatives and class counsel: family relationships,
employment relationships, present or former client-lawyer relationships, and
contractual relationships. In addition, it would require a description of “the
circumstances under which each class representative or named plaintiff
agreed to be included in the complaint” and disclosure of any other class
action in which the proposed class representative has a similar role.33 If the
provision merely required these disclosures, it would be unobjectionable.
But FICALA goes further, prohibiting certification of a class action “in
which any proposed class representative or named plaintiff is a relative or
employee of class counsel.”34 The original version of this provision was
much more problematic. It included client-lawyer relationships in the
prohibition, and it applied to all types of class actions.35 Wisely, the bill’s
proponents amended the provision so that it does not stop institutional
investors from serving as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions pursuant
to the empowered-lead-plaintiff model of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.36 Even so, the provision goes too far, as a prohibition
on relationships between class representatives and class counsel would
accomplish little. Concerns about class counsel conflicts of interest are real,
but this proposal adds an unnecessary constraint on who can serve as class
counsel and class representative.
C. MDL Personal Injury Plaintiff Fact Submission
FICALA includes a provision that would require an “allegations
verification” of all MDL personal injury plaintiffs. Specifically, plaintiffs’
counsel would be required to “make a submission sufficient to demonstrate
that there is evidentiary support (including but not limited to medical records)
for the factual contentions in plaintiff’s complaint regarding the alleged

33. H.R. 985 § 103(a).
34. Id.
35. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103(a) (as introduced in the House, Feb. 9, 2017) (proposing
a new section to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1717(b)). The provision of the bill as originally
proposed read: “A Federal court shall not issue an order granting certification of any class
action in which any proposed class representative or named plaintiff is a relative of, is a present
or former employee of, is a present or former client of (other than with respect to the class
action), or has any contractual relationship with (other than with respect to the class action)
class counsel.” Id.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012). As revised, FICALA specifies that the section on class
representative conflicts of interest “shall not apply to a private action brought as a class action
that is subject to section 27(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . or section 21D(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” H.R. 985 § 103(a).
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injury, the exposure to the risk that allegedly caused the injury, and the
alleged cause of the injury.”37
Mass litigation may include a mix of meritorious and nonmeritorious
claims. Therefore, in some cases, it makes sense for judges to use plaintiff
fact sheets, Lone Pine orders,38 or phased discovery with first-phase
individual plaintiff interrogatories to identify claimants who lack basic
supporting information for their claims. But a one-size-fits-all approach
would create unnecessary burdens in cases that do not require such an
approach.
D. Cap on MDL Personal Injury Plaintiff Lawyer Fees and Costs
Under the misleadingly optimistic heading “Ensuring Proper Recovery for
Plaintiffs,” FICALA would cap MDL personal injury plaintiff lawyers’ fees
and costs at 20 percent. The bill approaches the fee cap from the back: “A
plaintiff who asserts personal injury claims in [MDL proceedings] shall
receive not less than 80 percent of any monetary recovery obtained for those
claims by settlement, judgment, or otherwise, subject to the satisfaction of
any liens for medical services . . . .”39 Excessive lawyers’ fees in mass
litigation are a legitimate concern. In mass collective representation, lawyers
enjoy economies of scale that bear on the reasonableness of contingent fee
amounts. But capping MDL fees and costs at a draconian 20 percent would
have substantial negative effects on access to high-quality lawyers.40
Imposing an automatic fee cap in MDL proceedings, but not in other cases,
could have a detrimental effect on the decision-making process at the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The Panel decides whether to order MDL
transfers based on its analysis of whether coordinated pretrial proceedings
would further the efficient resolution of a set of cases.41 Defendants and
plaintiffs often agree that MDL transfers make sense, and their arguments
before the Panel often focus on the question of in which district, rather than
whether, MDL proceedings should be convened. If the Panel’s decision to
transfer meant that plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees and costs would automatically be
capped at 20 percent, it would alter the proceedings in two ways. First, it
would make plaintiffs’ lawyers more likely to argue against MDL transfer,
even in cases that warrant coordinated proceedings for efficient judicial
handling. It would make defendants correspondingly more inclined to favor
37. Id. § 105 (proposing a new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407(i)).
38. See generally Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986) (requiring plaintiffs to provide certain supporting
information at the outset of litigation on pain of dismissal).
39. H.R. 985 § 105 (proposing new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407(l)).
40. On the irony of corporations’ pressing for price regulation, see J. Maria Glover,
“Encroachments and Oppressions”: The Corporatization of Procedure and the Decline of
Rule of Law, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2123 (2018) (“How quickly the champions of the
free market embrace ‘big government’ paternalism when it reduces their exposure to
liability!”).
41. See John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2225, 2228–29, 2236–37 (2008).
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MDL, if only because the fee cap would discourage high-quality plaintiffs’
lawyers from participating and discourage plaintiffs’ lawyers from investing
in the litigation. Second, it would put the Panel in the uncomfortable position
of knowing that, by ordering transfer, it would be imposing a draconian cap
on attorneys’ fees and costs. This would make it more difficult for the Panel
simply to decide, on the merits, whether pretrial coordinated proceedings are
warranted.
III. ISSUES THAT CONGRESS SHOULD LEAVE TO THE COURTS
Legislation is one way to reform procedure, but it is not the only way. In
terms of institutional competence, there are three main contenders for
addressing procedural problems in federal civil litigation. Some problems in
civil litigation ought to be resolved by courts in the context of live disputes
or permitted to percolate in the appellate courts. Other problems ought to be
resolved through the rulemaking process prescribed by the Rules Enabling
Act. Finally, some problems should be addressed by Congress. In thinking
about the FICALA package of proposals, it is helpful to distinguish between
those where Congress is sensibly taking action—even if the current proposal
is not the best way to solve the problem—and those where Congress ought
to leave the solution to the courts or to the process of amending the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Congress is well suited to address subject matter jurisdiction because only
Congress may grant jurisdictional power to the federal courts.42 Any changes
to diversity jurisdiction or other aspects of federal subject matter jurisdiction
must come from Congress.43 The Class Action Fairness Act of 200544 offers
a good example of Congress’s role in altering the class action landscape
through reform of the subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts.
Whatever one thinks of FICALA’s proposal regarding diversity jurisdiction
upon removal from state court,45 one cannot object to Congress’s
institutional role in considering the issue.
In addition, Congress is well suited to enact procedural reforms linked to
particular federal substantive statutes.46 In the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, for example, Congress altered class action procedures47
and pleading requirements48 for federal securities fraud cases. None of the
proposals in FICALA, however, fit this category. Much of FICALA would
reform procedure transsubstantively. Several of FICALA’s provisions are
non-transsubstantive, but not in a way that makes them suitable for
congressional intervention in procedure. The plaintiff fact submission,
interlocutory appeal, and fee cap apply only to personal injury plaintiffs.
42. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547–48 (1989).
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
45. See H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 104 (2017) (proposing new subsection to be codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1447(f)).
46. See Glover, supra note 40, at 2127–28.
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2012).
48. See id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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Personal injury claims, however, are not matters of federal substantive law.
When federal courts hear such claims in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction,
they must apply state substantive law.49
For the most part, procedural reform that does not concern subject matter
jurisdiction and that is not linked to particular federal substantive statutes is
better left to the courts and to the judicial rulemaking process. Thus, the
“same type and scope of injury” requirement for class certification, like other
aspects of class certification under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), would be better
left to the Rules Enabling Act process for amending the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.50 Likewise, the requirements for who may serve as class
counsel under Rule 23(g) are better left to the Rules Enabling Act amendment
process or entrusted to the careful attention of the district judge looking at
the relationships and potential conflicts of interest in a particular case. A
FICALA provision addressing the certification of issue class actions under
Rule 23(c)(4)51 similarly would be better addressed through the careful
process of amending Rule 23.
The ascertainability issue is one that has been considered in some detail by
courts and rulemakers. In its recent work drafting revisions to Rule 23, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules heeded the advice of its subcommittee
on class actions that the ascertainability issue is percolating in the appellate
courts, has resulted in a circuit split, and is likely to make its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court.52 It is an issue already implicit in the manageability aspect
of the superiority requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).53 Both the courts and the
rules committees are better situated than Congress to consider whether this
additional independent constraint on class certification would be useful.
Certain procedural issues are better left to judicial discretion. These are
procedures whose application ought to vary from case to case, where
legislative intervention may impose an unduly uniform approach. In
FICALA, the discovery stay in class actions and the plaintiff fact submission
in MDL fit this description. The wisdom of a discovery stay varies from case
to case and from motion to motion. The usefulness of plaintiff fact sheets
depends on the nature and size of the dispute, particularly whether it is the
type of dispute in which meritorious and nonmeritorious claims need to be
distinguished before proceeding with common discovery. Both should be
left to the discretion of the district judge, not imposed as a general rule.

49. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
51. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103(a) (2017) (proposing new section to be codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1720).
52. See Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/2015-11-05-minutes_civil_rules_meeting_final_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
MM33-DV73].
53. See Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2017).
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IV. SALVAGEABLE IDEAS
Having catalogued numerous aspects of FICALA that should be discarded,
the question remains: Does the bill contain any ideas worth keeping?
Opponents of FICALA were so outraged by the one-sidedness of the bill that
they paid scant attention to the pieces of it that might make sound procedural
reforms. I suggest that the bill contains several proposals that deserve serious
consideration as improvements to the litigation process. These reforms fall
into three categories: class counsel fees, reporting requirements for class
settlements, and subject matter jurisdiction. In each of these areas, the bill
addresses genuine problems and offers solutions that, if not perfect, at least
point in the right direction.
A. Reforms to Class Counsel Fees
FICALA includes three potentially useful provisions regarding class
counsel fees. Although the current language of two of the proposals goes too
far, they point in the right direction and could be tweaked into proposals
worthy of support.
First, FICALA would link class counsel fees to money actually received
by the class:
if a judgment or proposed settlement in a class action provides for a
monetary recovery, the portion of any attorneys’ fee award to class counsel
that is attributed to the monetary recovery shall be limited to a reasonable
percentage of any payments directly distributed to and received by class
members.54

The section raises plenty of questions: What counts as a “monetary
recovery”? What does it mean for a portion of a fee award to be “attributed
to the monetary recovery”? What constitutes a “reasonable percentage”?
What counts as “directly distributed to and received by”? If interpreted too
narrowly, the provision would unduly constrain remedial options in class
actions. The basic idea, however, is both sound and important. As I have
written elsewhere, some class action settlements include remedies with face
values that differ from their actual value to class members, and class counsel
have an incentive to maximize the apparent size of a settlement even if the
actual value to class members is small.55 Claims processes may be
unnecessarily burdensome, or entirely unnecessary.56 Coupons or credits
may not be transferrable or stackable.57 The best way to incentivize class
counsel to negotiate remedies of real value to class members is to link fees
to what class members get. Suppose a class action settlement provides a
monetary remedy on a claims-made basis and has a face value of $100
million; that is, $100 million is the maximum amount that might theoretically
54. H.R. 985 § 103.
55. See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class
Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 862–64 (2016).
56. See id. at 889–92.
57. See id. at 878–82.
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be paid if every class member were to submit a claim and receive a full
payment. And suppose that only a small number of class members
successfully submit claims, so the amount actually paid is $5 million. To the
extent that the court awards attorneys’ fees on a percent-of-fund basis, the
relevant number should be $5 million, not $100 million. By making fees
depend on the amount that class members actually receive, the reform would
encourage counsel to negotiate settlement terms with automatic payments
rather than a claims-made process whenever possible, or with simple claims
processes that maximize actual compensation to class members.
As currently offered, the FICALA provision may unduly constrain cy pres
remedies. Abusive cy pres settlements are a problem I have discussed
elsewhere.58 An appropriate cy pres remedy provides actual value to those
harmed by the defendant’s conduct, even if the remedy is not a direct payout
of money to class members, and class counsel fees should correspond to the
value a cy pres settlement provides as a remedy for class members. The
FICALA proposal might be interpreted not to apply to cy pres remedies by
reading “monetary recovery” narrowly. If it were interpreted this way, the
provision would do nothing to improve class counsel incentives regarding
cy pres settlement remedies, but neither would it diminish the opportunity to
craft appropriate cy pres remedies. At the other extreme, the FICALA
proposal might be interpreted to treat cy pres remedies as “monetary
recoveries” that are not “directly distributed to and received by class
members,”59 in which case the provision would instruct courts to award zero
attorneys’ fees for cy pres remedies. The context suggests that this is the
interpretation the bill’s proponents have in mind. If so, the provision would
have the unfortunate effect of eliminating cy pres remedies even in cases
where such remedies are appropriate. The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari to consider the issue of cy pres remedies in class action
settlements,60 so this issue may be in flux regardless of FICALA.
Second, just as FICALA would link class counsel fees to the actual value
of monetary remedies, it also would link class counsel fees to the actual value
of equitable relief: “if a judgment or proposed settlement in a class action
provides for equitable relief, the portion of any attorneys’ fee award to class
counsel that is attributed to the equitable relief shall be limited to a reasonable
percentage of the value of the equitable relief, including any injunctive
relief.”61 Class settlements too often include spurious injunctive relief, a
problem that could be reduced if courts were to pay greater attention to the
actual value of injunctive remedies in class settlements.62
Third, FICALA addresses the timing of class action fee awards. It would
defer the determination and payment of class counsel fees until after the
58. See id. at 882–89.
59. H.R. 985 § 103 (proposing new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1718(b)(2)).
60. Gaos v. Holyoak, 869 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Frank v. Gaos,
138 S. Ct. 1697 (Apr. 30, 2018) (No. 17-961).
61. H.R. 985 § 103(a) (proposing new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1718(b)(3)).
62. See Erichson, supra note 55, at 874–78.
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completion of any monetary distributions to the class.63 As discussed
above,64 this proposal goes too far. Some remedies—particularly those that
address harms with future contingencies, such as diseases with long latency
periods—may appropriately take decades to run their course. The FICALA
proposal seems aimed at making it difficult and slow for class action lawyers
to get paid for their work, and it comes across as a crass attempt to discourage
lawyers from filing class actions. The current proposal, if enacted, likely
would have the perverse effect of constraining the range of remedies that
lawyers would negotiate. Even in cases that warrant long-term remedies,
class action lawyers would be loath to craft settlements that would make their
fees uncollectible for years or decades.
But there is a sound idea underlying the fee-delay proposal. Often it is
difficult to assess the value of a class remedy before the remedy is distributed
to class members. In many cases, the remedy requires a claims process in
which the total number of claimants is unknown in advance, and claim rates
tend to be low. In some cases, the amount of individual monetary payouts
depends upon a claims process to determine the nature and extent of each
class member’s claim. When a remedy includes coupons or credits, it may
be unknown in advance how many class members will claim and redeem
them. When seeking approval of a settlement and an award of fees, class
action lawyers have an incentive to make the settlement appear as large as
possible. If fees were determined after remedy distribution, then the fees
would better reflect the value of the remedy.
Additionally, if fees were determined on this timeline, lawyers would have
an incentive to negotiate better settlements in the following ways: Where
possible, they would create settlements in which monetary remedies are paid
or credited automatically and directly to class members, rather than on a
claims-made basis. If a claims-made basis is necessary, then they would
prefer simple, clear, and nonthreatening processes to maximize the claims
rate. When including coupon or credit remedies, they would prefer to make
them transferrable and stackable to maximize the actual value to class
members. In other words, a fee-delay provision would mesh nicely with the
FICALA proposals to link class counsel fees to the actual value of monetary
and injunctive remedies to class members.
It is not hard to imagine a nondraconian version of the fee-delay proposal.
Rather than prohibiting payment of fees until after all remedies have been
distributed, it would provide for a periodic accounting of the remedy
distribution with periodic payment of class counsel fees corresponding to the
remedy. Periodic fee payments would achieve all of the benefits of the
FICALA proposal but without the undesirable effect of making long-term
remedies unviable.
All three of these reforms to class counsel fees would be better
accomplished by amending Rule 23(h) pursuant to the rulemaking process

63. H.R. 985 § 103(a).
64. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
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under the Rules Enabling Act.65 One might worry that the rulemaking
process’s receptivity to lawyer input would make it difficult to achieve these
reforms. The interests of plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants’ lawyers largely
align on topics related to the expediency of achieving class settlements. Both
groups stand to gain from settlements that provide lucrative fees to class
action lawyers in exchange for remedies of questionable value to class
members. The losers are the class members, but their interests are least likely
to be represented in rulemaking deliberations. Thus, one might worry that
the rulemaking process would fail to accomplish reforms that advance justice
at the expense of lawyers on both sides. But Congress may be no better. The
bottom line is that these reforms of class counsel fees have much to commend
them, whether enacted by legislation or by amendment to Rule 23(h).
B. Class Settlement Reporting
FICALA would impose reporting requirements regarding class settlement
distributions.66 It is too easy for inadequate claims processes to remain
hidden. To the extent class members are not seeing the benefits of class
action settlements, sunlight could be a powerful disinfectant. The bill also
would require a Federal Judicial Center report on class settlement
distributions.67 In this important area of civil justice, it would be useful for
lawyers, judges, scholars, and policymakers to have a clearer picture of
settlement outcomes. Opponents of FICALA worry that the proposal is
driven by a political desire of defense-oriented reformers to prove to
Congress and others that class members receive little compared to the amount
that class counsel receive. But that is not a sufficient reason to oppose the
collection and dissemination of this information. Whatever the data show, it
is important to make policy in light of the reality.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
FICALA includes a section labeled “Misjoinder of Plaintiffs in Personal
Injury and Wrongful Death Actions.”68 The provision has nothing to do with
“misjoinder” in the sense of the assertion of claims whose joinder is
impermissible. Rather, the provision would expand federal court jurisdiction
by permitting removal to federal court of actions that do not satisfy the
complete diversity requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).69 Specifically, the
FICALA provision states that, after removal of a state court action to federal
court, when deciding a remand motion, “the court shall apply the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332(a) to the claims of each plaintiff
65. See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
66. H.R. 985 § 103(a) (proposing new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1719(a)).
67. Id. § 103(a) (proposing new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1719(b)).
68. Id. § 104 (proposing new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(f)).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (permitting federal district courts to exercise original
jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different states); see also Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806) (interpreting the diversity jurisdiction statute to require
complete diversity of citizenship).
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individually, as though that plaintiff were the sole plaintiff in the action.”70
By requiring this analysis of diversity jurisdiction in multiplaintiff personal
injury actions at this stage, the provision would effectively repeal the
complete diversity requirement in such cases.
Underlying this proposal is a sound idea, the same basic idea that underlies
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: federal courts should be available to
resolve disputes of nationwide scope. Plaintiffs in mass tort litigation
sometimes file their claims in so-called “magnet” jurisdictions where they
hope to find plaintiff-friendly judges and juries, and they make their claims
nonremovable by tactically joining nondiverse plaintiffs. To the extent a
mass tort dispute reflects a national-market problem, and to the extent a
plaintiff and defendant are both from states other than the forum state, it
sometimes would be preferable, from an overall justice perspective, for a case
to be heard by a federal court rather than by the plaintiff’s selected state court.
But under current law, the defendant may be stuck in the state court because
the action lacks complete diversity of citizenship so there is no basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California71 significantly reduced
this problem by tightening personal jurisdiction in multiplaintiff, multistate
cases, but the problem could persist in some cases. The FICALA reform
aims to solve this problem by treating each plaintiff as meeting the diversity
requirement individually, without regard for other plaintiffs.
The problem is that the FICALA proposal goes much too far. This
proposal would be sensible if it were refined to address the particular
problems of mass tort litigation. As drafted, the provision applies even in a
simple two-plaintiff lawsuit and even in cases better handled by state judges.
The provision would create a substantial and unwarranted expansion of
federal court diversity jurisdiction.72 If the proposal were refined to address
the narrower problem of tactical joinder in magnet jurisdictions in mass tort
litigation, however, it might offer a prudent expansion of federal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
FICALA states that its purpose is to “assure fair and prompt recoveries for
class members and multidistrict litigation plaintiffs with legitimate claims”
and to “diminish abuses in class action and mass tort litigation that are
undermining the integrity of the U.S. legal system.”73 Most of its provisions
give the lie to this statement of purpose, or at least the part about assuring
fair and prompt recoveries for plaintiffs with legitimate claims. Overbearing
class certification constraints would make it difficult for plaintiffs to level the
field even in cases suitable for class treatment. Automatic discovery stays,
70. H.R. 985 § 104 (proposing new subsection to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(f)(2)).
71. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
72. On the efforts of corporate defendants to expand diversity jurisdiction in recent
decades because of the strategic advantage defendants find in federal courts, see Scott Dodson,
Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (2018).
73. H.R. 985 § 102(1)–(2).
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trial prohibition, and interlocutory appeals would grind the litigation process
to a crawl even in cases where such delays are unwarranted. A draconian
MDL fee cap would hinder access to legal services. These provisions, in the
aggregate, suggest that FICALA was driven not by a desire to assure fair and
prompt recoveries, but rather by a desire to make recoveries difficult for all
plaintiffs in class actions and MDL.
Nonetheless, several of the ideas in FICALA are true to its stated purpose.
These proposals, with a bit of tweaking, offer some hope of “assur[ing] fair
and prompt recoveries” while “diminish[ing] abuses in class action and mass
tort litigation.”74 Provisions that link class counsel fees to value for class
members could improve the quality of class action settlements, and the
provision on timing of fees—if tweaked to provide for periodic payments—
could further this result. Provisions on class settlement reporting could
improve understanding about mass dispute resolution, which in turn could
create incentives for better settlements as well as provide a sounder basis for
future procedural reform. And the provision on diversity jurisdiction—if
tweaked to target the problem of magnet jurisdictions in national-market
mass litigation—could improve the allocation of adjudicatory authority and
thereby improve the quality of justice in mass disputes.

74. Id.

